

SYMPOSIUM  
THE LIFE, THE IMAGE AND THE PROBLEMS  
OF DEMOCRACY



DEMOCRACY: A LIFE  
*RESPONSE*

BY  
PAUL CARTLEDGE

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# Democracy: A Life *Response*

Paul Cartledge

## I

### *Preamble*

**T**his is not the first time that I have responded to a – brilliant – collection of papers somehow prompted or provoked (I dare not say inspired) by work of my own. I did so first in a volume that arose from a Cambridge seminar convened to mark my retirement in 2014 from my post as the inaugural A.G. Leventis Professor of Greek Culture in the Faculty of Classics, University of Cambridge: Allen et al. 2018. ('Allen et al. 2018' is just one of the titles listed in the *Appendix* to this *Response*. This contains a selection of relevant titles published in or after 2016 that could not be properly discussed or even in many cases cited in the following *Response* itself. The list is as long as it is, in part because my 'life' of democracy includes 'modern' and 'contemporary' as well as 'ancient' democracy, in part because it includes important works cited by my respondents, but in even more telling part because of the state of 'democracy,'

globally speaking, in recent and current times, or rather thanks to the (generally parlous) state we're in.)

That collection was what might in other circumstances have been called a *Festschrift*, and – in accordance with the rules of that genre, and so far as the work of mine discussed or mentioned there was concerned – altogether too gently positive. The present exercise, for the existence of which we are indebted to the good offices of Professors Paolo Bellini, Fabrizio Sciacca and Massimo Palma, is a very different matter.

It is a virtual symposium: at its heart are seven responses, or ripostes, to my 2016/2018 monograph, *Democracy: A Life*, topped and tailed by my prefatory *Statement* and my *Response* (to the responses/ripostes). The exercise, so far from being mere navel-gazing, would seem to be all too timely. For it's official: we live in an 'age of autocracies.' This is not only my judgement. The Foreign Affairs Select Committee of the UK Parliament, a cross-party committee, has just published a report entitled "A cautious embrace: defending democracy in an age of autocracies.". Jenny Roberts's response below backs that up: on its first page (p. 95) she writes that "democracy is under assault in many parts of the globe," and on its last (p. 114) she reiterates that these are "dark days for democracy."

What is to be done? What can academics and public intellectuals specifically contribute both to improve debate about and to remedy the actual political situation, whether globally or more locally? It's in that spirit that I set out on my quest for democracy ancient and modern a dozen years ago, but it's in a spirit of greater despondency than I could possibly have imagined then that I find myself writing these words now.

Full disclosure: The choice of respondents was indeed something in which I had a hand, but of editorial control or even

influence have I had none. It is for readers to judge, of course, but my firm conviction is that that denial has been all to the good; indeed, believing as I do that debate, open, free and critical debate, is of the essence in any properly democratic discussion – of democracy, or whatever – I can only say that, the tougher the criticism of that sort directed towards my *Democracy* book, the better. At risk of appearing either merely sycophantic or altogether too keen to indulge in *captatio benevolentiae*, I am bound to say that I was and am astonished both by the generosity of my respondents in giving up their time and effort to this project and by the quality and practical utility of their responses.

I couldn't have hoped or indeed thought it worthwhile to respond to all or even most of the many significant points made either against the book or in some relation to it. I have chosen to organise my Response under five headings: three are the three main 'objectives' I set out in my 'Statement,' above; these are framed by the other two, namely, the issue/problematic of definition(s), and a sections of thoughts as to possible/viable future directions of democratic theory and democratic practice.

Under the first four of these headings I have aimed to respond appropriately to as many as possible of the most important points made by all or most of the respondents, often choosing just one or two respondents' responses as the focus. I have not found this easy! Only under the fifth and final heading do I cut loose, or play fast and loose, as it may well seem, and indulge in some 'blue-skies' thinking – or wish-fulfilment.

### **I. What is/was *demokratia* – and democracy? Definitions ancient and modern**

When I was cutting my philosophical and meta-philosophical teeth as an Oxford undergraduate in the late 1960s, what was

known as “Oxford philosophy” was all the rage. I mean, it was a cause of burning significance both to its proponents and to its equally fierce opponents (such as Ernest Gellner). In a nutshell: suppose the topic of the day – or the weekly tutorial – to be “personal identity,” the ‘Oxford’ approach was before all else to ask or demand: ‘what do you mean by “person”, what do you mean by “identity”?’ Only once the – mainly linguistic – possibilities of those interrogatives had been exhausted, and that might quite legitimately mean writing most of or even the whole essay, only then might one turn, reluctantly, to examine the substantive as opposed to the formal, semantic issues.

But of course it’s not a merely formal issue to ask and try to resolve the question, what do you mean by ‘*demokratia*’ – or by ‘democracy’? Today, when the UK constitution – unwritten, but with significant written elements – is again a matter for open discussion and question, it almost seems superfluous to make that point. The former question, however, regarding the meaning(s) of (ancient Greek) *demokratia*, is easier to get at, to prise open, than the latter. Carol Attack’s response is the one that I have found most challenging and provocative, in the best senses, in this regard, though all respondents have something telling to say.

I’m sometimes tempted to say that “there was no such thing as ancient Greek democracy,” and I generally prefer to write “democracy in ancient Greece”. At one extreme, Athens had three or four versions of its patent *demokratia* between about 500 and 322 BCE, and other versions subsequently (see further below); and many cities never had any version whatsoever. But Dr Attack wishes to push the envelope further, and question the link posited between any monadic conception of democracy and any claim to popular sovereignty. I myself find the idea let alone the practice of ‘sovereignty’ something of a challenge – in antiquity as today; so I leave readers to tussle with that conundrum.

Josh Ober comes at me from a different angle, on the definitional side of things. As usual, he manages to frame his questions in such a way as to open up new, fruitful perspectives. As it happens, I agree with all ten of his thought-experimental representations of the democratic views of ‘a representative sample of ordinary, presumptively patriotic, “middling” Athenian citizens’, though I might want to tweak the wording in some cases, and possibly slightly rearrange their order. However, I would also want to add one further, cardinally definitional democratic thought: that for such “middling” democrats democracy was in its originary, foundational myth-symbolism anti-tyrannical, that is regarded as the very antithesis of all that tyranny was and stood for and did. It would be more controversial, because tending to represent or favour a more extreme rather than “middling” democratic view, to make a bow to Aristotle and his political-theoretical nostrum that democracy essentially was the rule of the poor – over the rich - citizens, irrespective of whether the poor were or were not also the many/majority of citizens.

## II

### **How and why did ancient *demokratia* first come to be, in the 6th/5th centuries BCE?**

Quite apart from the transnational, or even global, definitional question of whether it was within ancient Hellas, the ancient Greek world of politics, that democracy properly – or at any rate plausibly – so labelled first made its appearance, there subsists the no less interesting and important question of why something that by c. 450 BCE had come to be so labelled, as *demokratia*, had emerged. Kyle Harper, while addressing chiefly the issue of Roman ‘democracy’ or rather its absence (below), has suggestive remarks on why this

matter of origins is a continuing – and possibly unresolvable – issue.

But it is Josh Ober – who has of course made me think and re-think all sorts of democracy-related issues, as well as being the joint dedicatee of the *Democracy* book (along with ‘Leveller’ John Lilburne...) – who has most influenced me with regard to the (or at least a plausibly possible) Cleisthenic ‘revolution’. Indeed, it is he who has most influenced my own take on the crucial century or so from c. 550 to 450 BCE. But this may also be the point to draw attention to what I feel in retrospect I may have somewhat underplayed in the book: this is the specifically French contribution to the study of ancient Greek democracy over the last half-century or so, beginning indeed with the joint 1964 study by Pierre Vidal-Naquet and Pierre Lévêque of Cleisthenes and his putatively highly intellectual revolution and ‘invention’ of democracy. From those two scholars, and the incomparable ‘Jipé,’ J-P. Vernant, there is a direct line of intellectual descent via Nicole Loraux, Pauline Schmitt and François Hartog to today’s stars, Vincent Azoulay and Paulin Ismard. And that is by no means a complete listing. Part of that ‘invention,’ a key part according to Vernant and Vidal-Naquet, was the invention of tragedy as a popular religio-political art form of a decidedly democratic character; I was therefore heartened to read the contribution of Anhalt 2017 to enriching the picture of Athenian democracy as culture.

Both Atack and Roberts very properly here raise sharply the question of inclusivity – who was a democratic citizen? (Kasimis 2018 also explores the ‘limits’ of Athenian democracy from a feminist perspective.) Roberts in turn raises another causal, inclusivity issue: slavery. First women, then slaves – that, so she argues, was how the ancient Athenians and other Greeks widened the net and deepened the reach of very obviously non- or anti-



democratic exclusivity and oppression. Paulin Ismard too (2019) has argued that the cancer of slavery penetrated to the very vitals of ancient Athenian democracy. Aristotle's notoriously sexist formulation – all women by their very, unalterable nature lack the ability to make their ratiocinative capacity active and authoritative – seems to provide the pseudo-intellectual underpinning for what was in fact a crudely masculinist way of (conceiving political) life.

Yet there is another side, if a very much feebler one, which should at least be put. Athenian women were 'citizens' and even sometimes referred to as *politides*, using the feminine grammatical gender of *politai*. Athenian citizen women were graciously permitted to celebrate women-only religious festivals, whereas there were no citizen men-only festivals. Aristophanes's counter-cultural satirical comedy *Women Attending the Ecclesia* (probably c. 392) arguably does imply or betray a certain feminism. Finally, following 451 BCE, and the citizenship law proposed by Pericles, at least half of a – male – citizen's citizen entitlement had to be female: his mother had to be a lawfully accredited Athenian citizen woman, and probably also lawfully married to his father.

There were also exclusively female citizen priesthoods – as there were also exclusively male ones. However, in the case of one new, exclusively female official religious position, that of priestess of the cult of Athena Nike as instituted probably in the mid-5th century BCE, it is possible to argue that a parallel female route had been opened up – of course by the citizen men, voting in their men-only Assembly: for the new priestess was to be selected, not by a mere matter of hereditary succession thanks to the accident of birth, nor even by the – oligarchic – method of election, but by the democratic method of the lot and from all Athenian citizen women.

### III

#### **How and why did *demokratia* spread, transmogrify, degenerate, disappear from the 4th c BCE to the 6th CE?**

Carol Atack (pp. 30-32) rightly suggests that a pluralist, non-monadic definition of *demokratia* would allow us to look with greater sympathy on the kind of *demokratia* that Athens among others experienced in the post-Alexander Hellenistic period. This is where a great deal of recent fruitful work has been done. Josh Ober likewise suggests that he has sympathy for a much more strongly positive view of post-Alexander Hellenistic democracy at Athens and elsewhere than I have been willing to express. But on this I remain quite adamant: one of the prime conditions of a polis's being a polis properly so called – any polis, not one of a democratic as opposed to an oligarchic or monarchical political complexion – was *autonomia*, which, as Mogens Hansen has demonstrated, essentially meant freedom from external political interference. With the best will in the world no one could describe post-Alexander Athens, the Athens of Callias of Sphettus, say, as 'autonomous' in that sense. Hellenistic Rhodes arguably was – but then, again arguably, it wasn't democratic.

'Hellenistic' from a Greek point of view was also 'Middle and Late Republican' from a Roman standpoint, and Kyle Harper's brilliant essay focuses, sharply, on "the Roman question." It was a considerable relief to me to find him declaring unequivocally that "Ancient Rome was plainly never a democracy at any point in its long political career" (p. 49; cf. p. 51), a fact that "is ultimately neither surprising nor especially profound" (p. 52). Maybe not, but, given the widespread tendency to confuse (dare I say 'mere') republicanism with democracy, that is not uninteresting or unimportant. Which takes us conveniently on to my penultimate interrogative heading.

## IV

### **How and what was ‘democracy’ from the 17th century CE to the present?**

This portion of my book was – of course – the sketchiest. Jim Miller’s response is therefore for me the one carrying the most heft. He is committed, as I am, to a ‘liberal’ form of democracy. I therefore make mention here of Josh Ober’s deeply insightful thought-experiment in “democracy before liberalism” (2017); also of Jim’s New School colleague Helena Rosenblatt’s “lost history” of liberal ideas going all the way back to Rome (2018).

Jim Miller has of course written not only a response to my book but an entire book on parallel but also significantly different lines from 1792 to the present (2018). He helpfully summarises here (pp. 79-80) what he takes to be the “four major approaches to understanding modern democracy.” But then he does something, takes a step, which probably James Kierstead (below) would approve but which I still resile from, namely to identify modern ‘democracy,’ the word, with the ancient, on the grounds that it “at its core, even today, implies ‘people-power.’” To me, that smacks rather more of wish-fulfilment than it does of ironclad realism, and to be vulnerable to the blatantly ideological “will-of-the-people” sort of misappropriation that I go on to criticise below.

## V

### **What is to be done, democratically speaking?**

There is nothing new under the sun – to take one salient example from Classical Athenian history, Cleon was a democratic-demagogic ‘populist.’ However, the practical application of the thoroughly and essentially democratic notion of responsibility/accountability that was inbuilt into the democratic

system of Classical Athens reined him in. It took a major defeat and massive foreign intervention by non- or rather anti-democratic Sparta to terminate for a fortunately short while all democratic safeguards at Athens.

Or is there really nothing new? Once upon a time there was something called the ‘democratic deficit’ – now there’s a democratic surplus. It is partly knowingly willed, partly self-inflicted. Thanks to the ever-more widespread resort to direct-democracy referendums, the results of which are weaponised as ‘the will of the people’, and thanks partly to the *Zeitgeist* – we seem to be living in an age of authoritarian populism, one that to my possibly jaundiced eye seems to be teetering ever more precariously on the brink of the f-word – fascism (Stanley 2019; Traverso 2019).

Even if my readers are unwilling to follow me that far, there does seem to be a growing consensus that democracy in the digital age is qualitatively different from any democracy known or practised in the pre-social media, pre-post-truth age. The dread words ‘Cambridge Analytica’ (cf. Kaiser 2019) almost say it all. There is indeed a case for holding that Shoshana Zuboff’s *The Age of Surveillance Capitalism* is among the top half-dozen most important books published since 2000. But I would also wish to include in that list Peter Pomerantsev’s *This Is Not Propaganda*, not least for its truly terrifying subtitle, *Adventures in the War Against Reality*. There is not, however, a consensus on how to come to terms with, or what to do about, that fact, or rather – from a liberal-democratic perspective – how to preserve the liberal in ‘liberal democracy’ without permitting catastrophically free rein to digitally driven disinformation on a mass scale.

James Kierstead has taken and again takes (esp. p. 61) me to task in a number of ways; here I focus just on his disagreement with me over how ‘democratic’ the June 2016 UK/EU referendum was, and – consequently – how respectful one ought to be of its

outcome, both on its own terms then, and with the benefit of 40+ months' hindsight. Let me be clear: I was not and am not disappointed in principle; I did think that even our limited – representative, etc. – democracy had been hollowed out, that there was a democratic deficit that needed to be remedied, and that in principle a mass plebiscite involving e-voting might be a route to effecting those changes and improvements. On the other hand, as I wrote (in a blog) already during the 2016 Referendum campaign and before the result, I did not think that a yes/no binary referendum was a suitable vehicle for addressing the immensely complex and by no means only political problems that the referendum was allegedly designed to address, nor did I think that those who advocated a referendum of this type were sufficiently cognizant of the very nature and history of the UK's democratic – or part-democratic – constitution, and so sufficiently aware of the risk that they might actually be jeopardising the very stability of our parliamentary system. Such has sadly proven to be the case.

But, had I been in any doubt about the wisdom or justifiability of my negative views, for example on the grounds that as a convinced 'Remain' voter I was merely prejudiced, such doubts would have been dispelled by one 'argument' proposed wilfully and often ignorantly by both intellectual and non-intellectual defenders of both the Referendum process as such and its result. This is the claim that the process and the vote amount to, or constitute, "the will of the people," and that the (single) meaning of that phrase is both transparently and unambiguously self-evident. It hardly needs saying that there's no such – unambiguous - thing: both 'will' and 'people' require very careful unpacking, not to mention the singularity of 'the' in each case.

Of course, it's a very academic point to note that the phrase ultimately was coined in Rome, and frequently used by a thinker and politician whom no ancients and few moderns would label a

‘democrat,’ namely Cicero: *voluntas populi*. Lex Paulson’s recent Sorbonne doctoral thesis is a masterclass on that. But even without that peculiarly ancient intellectual buttressing I would still ask “will of the people” proponents to ask themselves whether the June 2016 result was obtained by fair (it certainly wasn’t by entirely legal) means, whether a vote on such a fundamental issue carried by fewer than 40 per cent of the potential (as distinct from the actually voting) electorate should be considered binding on the other 60 + per cent, and, not least, whether the ‘facts’ (as opposed to the emotions) involved have or have not changed, significantly, since June 2016. When the facts change, my opinions change too, is a useful nostrum – though it can always be debated what are the facts, and which of them are the most decisively significant. However, many, vital facts not only have demonstrably changed since June 2016, not least demographically speaking, but have actually become widely apparent for the first time in a way they were either unapparent or deliberately misrepresented or suppressed during the first half of 2016.

Which takes me on finally to the few positive, practical suggestions I have as to how politics, at least UK politics, might be done and conceived rather better in the future. Let there, first, be light rather than heat. If deliberation is to bear its etymological connotation of deliberate (adjectival sense), then let us begin to hurry forward slowly, that is, deliberately. If there must be referendums of any kind – and the Swiss among others have shown that they can be managed well – then let there be more genuinely advisory as opposed to once-for-all referendums or plebiscites. And let there be super-majorities for referendums on basic issues and principles that are to be honoured with implementation – or at least let the vote be advisory in the first instance, and duly observed as such afterwards, with proper further popular consultation and parliamentary deliberation, before implementation. That in itself would not be purely, or puristically,

democratic, but it would obviate the possibility of endless dissension of the kind that threatens the very democratic system itself.

I once was an advocate of doing away with political parties – returning to the ancient Greek, party-free system, since parties seemed to me to have become toxic. They still seem to me to be toxic, and not only in the UK, but, as long as one has a functioning representative system of governance, representatives are obliged to sign up to and be held to account for policies that are not merely personal expressions of will or desire. Churchill wittily said democracy was the worst governmental system – apart from all the rest that have been tried. Ditto political parties. We in the UK operate a party-based, “first-past-the-post” electoral system, among the greatest virtues of which it was once argued was that it was a way of ensuring strong, stable governments. That argument has now failed empirically. Some form of proportional representation – not that rejected by referendum in the UK in 2012! – must be carefully devised and, after due deliberation involving a constitutional reform commission or commissions chosen at least in part by lottery, passed through Parliament. Parliament in the UK today comprises two chambers: the ‘upper’ chamber, or House of Lords, is anachronistic not only in its very title (there are ‘Ladies’ there too) but in its – unelected – mode of recruitment. At least some significant proportion of the membership of both Houses should be selected by lottery. I could go on, but... I’m not a politician.

Those who wish for further guidance on this would be well advised to read Scott & Makres 2019, hot off the press, which includes a series of uncomfortable practical ‘lessons’ drawn from comparing ancient with modern democracy; cf. Alev Scott 2019. Alternatively, on “how democracies die,” Levitsky & Ziblatt 2018 makes for equally uncomfortable reading, as does Mounk 2018,

with his to me almost unthinkable (hitherto) opposition of ‘The People’ and ‘Democracy.’ Astonishing as it would once have seemed, there is now a need, as a matter of extreme urgency, for “defence of democracy” (Fuller 2019).

### **Envoi**

To conclude: all my respondents’ responses are hugely worth reading in their own right, independently and not merely or only as responses to my work. Would I have – should I have – written *Democracy: A Life* very differently, in light of them? Of course I should, and I hope would, had I had them before me. Fail again – only fail better!

*Clare College, Cambridge*



## Appendix

### A selection of relevant titles published 2016-2019

Acemoglu, Daron & Robinson, James. A. 2019. *The Narrow Corridor. States, Societies and the Fate of Liberty*. London: Penguin Books.

Adut, Ari. 2018. *Reign of Appearances. The Misery and Splendor of the Public Sphere*. Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press.

Allen, Danielle, Christesen Paul & Millett Paul (eds.). 2018. *How To Do Things With History*. New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Anhalt, Emily Katz. 2017. *Enraged. Why Violent Times Need Ancient Greek Myths*. New Haven & London: Yale University Press.

Atack, Carol. 2019. *The Discourse of Kingship in Classical Greece*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Berry, M. Frances. 2018. *History Teaches Us to Resist: How Progressive Movements Have Succeeded in Challenging Times*. New York: Beacon Press.

Crewe, Ivor & Sanders, David (eds.). 2020. *Authoritarian Populism and Liberal Democracy*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Davies, William. 2019 (November 8). “The crisis of government: representation vs. mobilization.”  
<https://www.berggruen.org/the-worldpost/articles/category/opinion/>

- Dunleavy, Patrick, Park, Alice & Taylor, Ros (eds.). 2018. *The UK's Changing Democracy: The 2018 Democratic Audit*. London: LSE Press.
- Duploux, Alain & Brock, Roger (eds.). 2018. *Defining Citizenship in Archaic Greece*. Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press.
- Eatwell, Roger & Goodwin, Matthew. 2018. *National Populism. The Revolt against Liberal Democracy*. London: Penguin Books.
- Erman, Michel. 2019. *Aimons-nous encore la liberté?*. Paris: Plon.
- Fleck, Robert K. & Hanssen, F. Andrew. 2018. "Ancient Greece: Democracy and Autocracy," in *Oxford Handbook of Public Choice*. Edited by Roger D. Congleton, Bernard N. Grofman & Stefan Voigt. Vol. 2: Oxford: Oxford University Press: 745-59.
- Fuller, Roslyn. 2019. *In Defence of Democracy*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Gardels, Nathan & Berggruen, Nicolas. 2019. *Renovating Democracy. Governing in the Age of Globalization and Digital Capitalism*. Berkeley & London: University of California Press.
- Hameleers, Michael & de Vreese, Claes. 2018. "To whom are 'the People' opposed? Conceptualizing and measuring citizens' populist attitudes as a multidimensional construct," *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties*: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17457289.2018.1532434>

- Hartog, François. 2018. *Partir pour la Grèce*. New Edition. Paris: Flammarion.
- Innes, Joanna & Philp, Mark (eds.). 2018. *Re-Imagining Democracy in the Mediterranean, 1780-1860*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ismard, Paulin. 2019. *La cité et ses esclaves. Institution, fictions, expériences*. Paris: Seuil.
- Kaiser, Brittany. 2019. *Targeted: The Cambridge Analytica Whistle-Blower's Inside Story of How Big Data, Trump, and Facebook Broke Democracy and How It Can Happen Again*. New York: HarperCollins.
- Kasimis, Demetra. 2018. *The Perpetual Immigrant and the Limits of Athenian Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kenski, Kate & Jamieson Kathleen H. (eds.). 2017. *The Oxford Handbook of Political Communication*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Levitsky, Steven & Ziblatt, Daniel. 2018. *How Democracies Die*. New York: Broadway.
- Malik, Nesrine. 2019. *We Need New Stories: Challenging the Toxic Myths Behind Our Age of Discontent*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson.
- Milios, Andreas. 2019. *Arkhaia kai Synkhroni Dhimokratia. Dhidhagmata apo tin Arkhaia*. Athens: Ath. Stamoulis.

- Miller, James E. 2018. *Can Democracy Work? A short history of a radical idea, from Ancient Athens to Our World*. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux.
- Moatti, Claudia. 2018. *Res publica. Histoire romaine de la chose politique*. Paris: Fayard.
- Mouck, Yascha. 2018. *The People vs. Democracy: Why Our Freedom Is in Danger and How to Save It*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Naimark, Norman M. 2019. *Stalin and the Fate of Europe. The Postwar Struggle for Sovereignty*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.
- Ober, Josiah. 2017. *Demopolis: Democracy Before Liberalism in Theory and Practice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Paulson, Lex. 2017. Doctoral Thesis (Paris I-Sorbonne) on the origins of the will, free will and the will of the people in the works of Cicero.
- Pomerantsev, Peter. 2019. *This is Not Propaganda: Adventures in the War Against Reality*. London: Faber & Faber.
- Revault d'Allonnes, Myriam. 2018. *La faiblesse du vrai. Ce que la post-vérité fait à notre monde commun*. Paris: Seuil.
- Revelli, Marco. 2019 (2017). *The New Populism. Democracy Stares into the Abyss*, trans. D. Broder. London & New York: Verso.
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- Santas, Gerasimos & Anagnostopoulos, Georgios (eds.). 2019. *Democracy, Justice, and Equality in Ancient Greece: Historical and Philosophical Perspectives*. Berlin & Heidelberg: Springer.
- Scott, Alev. 2019. “Britons should learn to vote like the Ancient Greeks,” *Financial Times*, November 24. <https://www.ft.com/content/d8eff2de-0d30-11ea-8fb7-8fcec0c3b0f9>.
- Scott, Alev & Makres, Andronike. 2019. *Power & The People. Five lessons from the Birthplace of Democracy*. London: Riverrun.
- Simonton, Matt. Forthcoming. *Ancient Democracies* (Key Themes in Ancient History series). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Stanley, Jason. 2019. *How Fascism Works*. New York: Random House.
- Stengel, Richard. Forthcoming. *Information Wars: How We Lost the Global Battle Against Disinformation & What We Can Do About It*.
- Taylor, Astra. 2019. *Democracy May Not Exist but We’ll Miss It When It’s Gone*. London & New York: Verso.
- Temelkuran, Ece. 2019. *How to Lose a Country: the 7 steps from democracy to dictatorship*. London: Fourth Estate.
- Tridimas, George. 2019. ‘Democracy without political parties: the case of ancient Athens’, *Journal of Institutional Economics*: 1-16. <https://www.cambridge.org/core>

Traverso, Enzo. 2019. *The New Face of Fascism. Populism and the Far Right*. London: Verso.

Wedin, Tomas & Wilen, Carl. 2019. “Ancient equality against modern democracy: resources of critique in Hannah Arendt and Ellen Meiksins Wood,” *Distinktion: Journal of Social Theory*.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/1600910X.2019.1653347>